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Abstract
The restructuring processes of the Spanish financial entities over the last years has led us to ana-
lyze financially how efficiency and solvency of banks and savings banks explain the decisions of 
incorporation and control of these entities. We analyze 51 Spanish financial entities for the period 
2008-2012. The results show higher solvency and efficiency of banks over savings banks. On the 
other hand, after the first integrations it is observed that it is still early for these ratios to improve on 
the results obtained by the entities before the integrations. However, from the financial point of view, 
these integrations do explain how correct the start-up and intensification of the restructuring process-
es were. There are some exceptions to the global criteria, which are explained by the size, strength 
and structure of the business and the closeness of its financial management scope to the area and 
business structure of the bigger banking groups.
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Resumen
Los procesos de reestructuración de las entidades de crédito españolas en estos últimos años nos 
han llevado a analizar en qué medida la eficiencia y solvencia de estos dos tipos de entidades explican 
las decisiones de integración y dominio de las mismas viéndolo, únicamente, desde un punto de vista 
de análisis financiero. Para ello analizamos 51 entidades españolas en el periodo 2008-2012. Los re-
sultados muestran unos mayores valores de solvencia y eficiencia de los bancos sobre las cajas. Por otro 
lado, se observa que aún es pronto para que, tras las primeras integraciones, estos ratios superen los 
mejores valores a nivel individual. No obstante, sí que explican estas concentraciones, desde el punto 
de vista abordado, el financiero, lo acertado del inicio e intensificación en los procesos de reestructu-
ración, así como las decisiones de forma societaria de la entidad dominante y/o resultante tras la inte-
gración. Existe alguna excepción al criterio general aludido, siendo en tal caso explicada por el tamaño, 
fortaleza y estructura de negocio, más cercana en el campo de su gestión financiera al ámbito y estruc-
tura de negocio de los grandes grupos bancarios.
Derechos reservados © 2015 Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, Facultad de Contaduría y 
Administración.  Este es un artículo de acceso abierto distribuido bajo los términos de la Licencia 
Creative Commons CC BY-NC-ND 4.0. 
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Introduction
In the summer of 2007 the “subprime mortgages” crisis started. These were a financial 
product whose risks were spread among various agents and markets through securitiza-
tion and credit derivatives. At first, this situation did not affect the Spanish authorities di-
rectly, but it was one of the triggers of a chain of effects in global economies and financial 
markets that soon, among other factors, would affect Spain.
Its immediate consequence was the deterioration of liquidity and funding, which drove 
several authorities to take support measures which had varying effects both over time and 
in inland areas of application.
In the case of Spain the passage from the crisis of the financial economy to the real 
economy took less than a year from the appearance of the first symptoms in North Ameri-
ca. The Spanish economy fell into recession in late 2008. The fall in production and rising 
unemployment pushed up default rates of banks and savings banks and, consequently, the 
need for higher provisions of insolvency. Furthermore, there was an increase in financial 
costs brought about by the increasing reliance on wholesale funding and also by sudden 
difficulties in these markets. In addition, the slowdown in the housing market affected 
many entities that had a high concentration in the field of real estate development and 
construction (Aríztegui, 2011).
With this background, it was already clear that there was an urgent need to undertake 
a restructuring of the sector and to support this process in a way that allowed the solvency 
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to be strengthened of those institutions that decide to undertake plans to improve their 
efficiency through mergers or other integration transactions.
Clearly by late 2011, and throughout 2012 and 2013, we were witnessing an intense re-
organization process of  territorial financial institutions (savings banks) which, forced by 
a series of regulatory rules, sought to strengthen the system and thus “solve the problems 
of liquidity, solvency and default of these entities” (Palomo, Sanchis-Palacio, & Gutiér-
rez-Fernández, 2011).
Consequently, savings banksa are in particular the main figures in the restructuring 
process. Their legislation reform involved significant changes in its legal form, with sev-
eral variants. Thus, the adjustment to the declining demand gave rise to a situation of ex-
cess capacity, leading to an urgent need to resize the sector (González Sánchez & García 
Muiña, 2011). All the savings banks, except Caixa Ontinyent and Pollensa, transferred 
their assets and liabilities to another entity regulated as commercial bank with the struc-
ture of a public limited company, in which those saving banks which have not been na-
tionalized or taken over are major shareholders.
These circumstances are of sufficient importance to merit research on whether these 
restructuring processes are improving the situation of the sector. We must point out that 
these restructuring processes are not unique of the Spanish Banking system. As we deep 
in the previous literature, we observe how these processes were carried out in other coun-
tries, even when the intensity of the crisis was not as worldwide as now. In this sense, we 
noted that several studies addressed the impact of the reform of the financial systems in 
the sector from an international point of view. An example of this can be seen in Table 1, 
although some of the studies are not strictly comparable in terms of full homogeneity, not 
only for the political systems in the respective countries but also for the type of problems, 
as they provide information on the intended purpose of restructuring examples in the 
banking sector at some level.
After this review, we observed how after the restructuring process there are two vari-
ables, efficiency and solvency, which in most cases improve considerably.
This paper aims to be the first in a series of observations over the next few years (until 
2016 at least) and aims to ascertain, first which financial entities had higher efficiency and 
solvency values. It also seeks to discover whether the concentration decisions of the Span-
ish banking sector followed the guidelines according to the values obtained by these two 
variables and according to previous experiences in other contexts. After that first goal, we 
thought it important to analyze the situation after the first integrations and to provide the 
methodology, with the values of the ratios indicated, for analysis in future years.
Therefore, for proper monitoring and analysis, this paper is structured in five sections. 
After the introduction, the second part provides a review of the development of those stan-
dards affecting the banking sector during 2009-2013. The third section describes the sam-
ple and presents the methodology and variables used in the analysis. Section 4 presents 
a Nowadays, the operating activities of saving banks and banks are identical. The unique difference is the 
legal form. This determines different management boards.
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Table 1
Reforms of the financial systems from an international point of view.
Country Year Effects Authors
Germany 1986-2001 Germany experiences one of the deepest consolidating 
processes, compared to USA, UK or Japan
Koetter, et al.  (2004)
1993-2003 The success or not of the banking mergers which 
mainly happened in the 90’s was an open debate 
One of the conclusions of this paper is that that 
entities arising from a merger are successful
Koetter (2005)
China 2003-… Because of the reform, the banking system achieved 
a  homogeneous structure, not only in terms of 
profitability, efficiency and quality of the assets, 
but also in size and geographical location. The 
restructuring of the banking sector was a basic 
pillar in the reform process and  was  focused on 
improving the solvency of the main Chinese Banks.
García Herrero and 
Santabárbara García 
(2009)
Egypt 1992-2007 After analyzing the impact of the reform of the financial 
systems on the competitiveness and efficiency of 
the banking  system and the impact on economic 
growth in the short and long term, the conclusion 
is that reforms have a positive and significant effect 
on competitiveness and efficiency of production
Poshakwale and Qian 
(2011)
United States 1990-2006 The number of banks in the United States fell by 32% 
between 1990 and 2006. In the mergers of "local" 
banks (community banks), the acquirers were more 
efficient and managed objectives better. These 
mergers led to the acquirer being stronger and more 
efficient and to better management of the bank
Jagtiani (2008)
Greece 2001-2009 Worsening of  efficiency (2003-2009) and solvency 
(2001-2009) of the Greek financial sector
Martín de Vidales 
Carrasco (2010)
Italy 1985-1996 After the mergers, there is no evidence of any 
improvement in profits: the increase of the revenues 
(in the face of a wider market for services and 
increased lending) is offset by an increase in labour 
costs. However, it is shown that after  the  merger 
profitability increases
Focarelli, Panetta, and 
Salleo (2002)
1995-2000 The results suggest the existence of benefits in terms 
of efficiency, deriving from the banks' consolidation
Colombo and Turati 
(2004)
Japan 1990-2000 The restructuring of the financial system occurs in 
the 1990s. Though the loan losses were almost 
unanimously recognized  as the origin of the fall 
of the Japanese banking system, it was not clear 
that they were the sole cause of the persistence of 
the crisis. Political responses highlighted the need 
to improve efficiency, especially, and drove 
more mergers
Bou-Said and Saucier 
(2003)
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Country Year Effects Authors
Jordan 1990-… The banking sector has witnessed significant 
developments over the past two decades. Since 2003 
there has been an unprecedented development in 
the work of banks in terms of quantity and quality. 
Moreover, the efficient functioning of the banking 
sector has become one of the main objectives of 
financial reforms. Profitability and efficiency also 
become one of the challenges faced by banks to 
strengthen their financial position to take on the 
risks associated with globalization
Ramadán, Kilani, and 
Kaddumi (2011)
Latinamerica 1993-2000 Analysis of eleven Latin American countries during 
a period characterized by significant restructuring 
reforms of their banking systems. A high degree 
of competition in banking is associated with 
reduced margins, low profitability and greater cost 
efficiency
Yildirim and Philippatos 
(2007) 
Nordic 
Countries
1988-1990 In order to overcome the crisis, countries like Norway, 
Finland  and Sweden opted for restructuring 
measures like mergers
Thorvald et al. (2004)
For the particular case of Norway, mergers of troubled 
banks with larger solvent banks were chosen
1985-1990 In the case of Finland, the overall efficiency analysis 
shows that it is lower in merged banks than in non 
merged ones
Kuussaari (1993)
1964-1985 In Denmark and Finland, for example, mergers made 
the purchaser large enough to act independently 
abroad
Fagerland 
Jacobsen (1997)
Portugal 1990-1995 Following the reform of the Portuguese banking 
system from 1986, the efficiency of new domestic 
banks in a more competitive banking system is 
quantified
Canhoto and Dermine 
(2003)
South Africa 1999-2008 The analysis of the evolution of competition and 
efficiency of the banking sector shows a progressive 
decrease in the number of efficient banks. It also 
reflects the dominance of five major banks that 
together represent more than 85% of  total bank 
assets
Mlambo and Ncube 
(2011)
Table 1 (continuation)
Reforms of the financial systems from an international point of view.
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Country Year Effects Authors
Turkey 2005-… Its banking system, once it had pulled through the 
severe financial crisis of1999 to 2001, has in 
recent tax years shown adequate levels of solvency, 
profitability and efficiency
Calvo Bernardino and 
Martín de Vidales 
Carrasco (2010)
Furthermore, the efficiency analysis reveals that 
market share is the most important determinant 
of efficiency. This  result supports the idea that 
banks benefit from economies of scale and as they 
increase their market share they will be better able 
to utilize their excess capacity
Ozdincer  and Ozyildirim 
(2006)
Venezuela 1996-2001 Mergers that took place in the Venezuelan 
banking system sought to reduce processing 
costs, take advantage of economies of scale, 
strengthen net worth and technological and 
operational transactions with a view to increasing 
the profitability of their activities
Bracho, Ariza, González, 
and Jiménez (2002)
Source: own elaboration.
Table 1 (continuation)
Reforms of the financial systems from an international point of view.
the findings and Section 5 analyzes the entities that were involved in any restructuring 
process. The paper ends with the main conclusions and lines for future research.
Literature review
At a European level, several studies analyze the significant impact degree that the Eco-
nomic and Monetary Union (EMU) has on the competence of the banking sector in those 
countries which adopted the single currency (Bikker & Groeneveld, 2000; De Bandt & 
Davis, 2000); whether bank concentration in a national market has a negative impact on the 
financial solvency of European banks (Uhde & Heimeshoff, 2009) or the determinants of 
bank profitability in several European countries, and also that a higher degree of concentra-
tion leads to a higher profitability (Molyneux & Thornton, 1992). In this sense, international 
comparisons of banking efficiency can be used to identify, among others, issues of interna-
tional consolidation of the banking industry. González (2009) analyzes the influence of bank 
efficiency and policy variables on the market structure. Their results are consistent with the 
efficiency-structure hypothesis, which states that the most efficient banks have, on average, 
higher levels of domestic market that enhance market concentration.
Studies have demonstrated appropriate values of efficiency and solvency of the Span-
ish banking sector, mainly in late 2008 (Álvarez, 2008; Maudos, 2009b). In this sense, 
although this efficiency had fallen from 2007, in 2008 it stood at 47%. As regards degree 
of solvency, in December 2008, with a value of 11.3%, Spain was at levels close to the 
European average (11.9% in the EU-15), well above the minimum required 8%. (Maudos, 
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2009a). However, in 2010, efficiency deteriorated. Bigger banks were more efficient than 
the industry average (Maudos, 2011). As for the differences between banks and savings 
banks, previous studies show how the savings banks are less efficient and solvent than 
banks. Fernández de Guevara (2007) analyzed the period 1992-2004 and Carbó and Mau-
dos (2010) to December 2009. Climent (2013) analyzes the determinants of solvency of 
the Spanish financial institutions in the period 2006-2009, concluding that banks achieve 
better solvency than savings banks.
Other studies show how in banks and savings banks there is a significant positive cor-
relation between measures of size, efficiency and financial profitability (Marín, Gómez, 
& Gómez, 2008) or Bernad, Fuentelsaz, & Gómez (2009), who claim that although it 
seems that mergers and acquisitions have sometimes been an effective way to deal with 
increased competition deriving from the new competitive environment, they do not al-
ways manage to improve the results of the entities involved. Moreover, other studies like 
Fernández, Fonseca, and González (2006) find that banks take more risks than savings 
banks, and Fonseca and González (2005) state that as the political presence increases on 
savings banks, so does their risk, as they may take riskier investments in the pursuit of po-
litical ends. The possibility of transferring funds in the commercial relationship between 
savings banks and regional governments can also favor risky investments, especially in 
saving banks with higher levels of public participation.
Elsewhere, the latest stress test published (September 2012) for a number of entities, 
shows this initial trend of solvency strength behind decisions made.
Regulatory developments 2009-2013 
Apart from the legal aspects of the savings banks and their need to  transform and up-
date as a consequence of the necessary adaptation to European directives, (including the 
initial definition of the Fund for Restructuring and Banking management), we can state 
that it was not until late 2011, early 2012, when the standards, were issued (and measures 
of economic and financial policy), were clearly determined in Spain regarding restructur-
ing and, especially, decreasing the debt of the financial system.
In this sense, we briefly show in Figure 1 synopsis and content of the standards and 
their evolution from 2009-2013.
As a result of all this legislation, several steps were taken to restructure the sector, as 
is shown in Table 2.
Without doubt, there will still be changes made in the last column, so it is important to 
note the content and results of the so-called stress test. The last one made in Spain points 
to a “clear exit point” from what we have commented on above in terms of future changes.
The stress tests have sought to assess the resilience of the banking system, and banks’ 
ability to absorb possible shocks related to their credit risks and the market, including 
the risk arising from investments in sovereign debt. Two macroeconomic scenarios were 
mainly considered: a reference and an adverse one. The latter will determine the potential 
need for additional capital.
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2009 26  June: RD Ley 9/209 Aim: to reinforce solvency and functioning of the financial entities FROB creation
2010
9 April: RD Ley 6/2010 Questions like management bodies are clarified 
9 July: RD ley 11/2010 The third and fourth final provisions of this Act made a number of clarifications to the new legal regime for savings banks.
2011
18 February: RD Ley 2/2011
There are two aims: to strengthen the level of solvency 
of banks through greater capital requirement of the highest quality; 
and to progress in the restructuring process 
of the savings banks.
4 March: Ley 2/2011
Requirement for greater transparency from financial institutions 
and introduction of a number of new requirements in financial 
supervision and in the protection 
of users of financial services
2013
22 March: RD Ley 6/2013
It states the mechanism to protect the owners of products like 
hybrid capital instruments and subordinated debt 
and other financial measures.
12 april: RD 256/2013 Corporative Govern: to evaluate the capacity of the people who are 
managing the credit institution. 
22 October: Ley 36/2010 - The new regime applicable to those SIP created between various entities is set up. 
- A new assumption to proceed in the restructuring of the financial 
institution with the intervention of FROB is set up.
2012
3 February: RD Ley 2/2012
Three basic objectives: 1) consolidation of balance sheets of 
banks, adversely affected by the deterioration of real estate assets; 
2) creation of incentives which provide 
an appropriate and efficient overcapacity adjustment and 3) 
strengthening of the governance institutions resulting from the 
integration processes.
11 May: RD Ley 18/2012
An attempt to dispel the uncertainties that are hindering the 
normalization of the Spanish financial sector and 
the recovery of its activity of directing the savings to the real 
economy, focusing on sanitation, as fast as possible, of real estate 
assets.
31 August : RD Ley 24/2012
Focused on regulating clearly and effectively the possible cases of 
restructuring in credit institutions, instruments and measures to be 
taken for each, and the effects that these instruments and 
measures may produce.
Fig. 1. Standard evolution 2009-2013.
Source: own elaboration.
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Table 2
Restructuring processof the spanish financial system.
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
La Caixa
La Caixa La Caixa
Caixabank
Caixabank
CaixaGirona
Caja Sol
CajaSol-Guadalajara
Banca Civica
CajaGuadalajara
Caja Navarra
Banca CivicaCaja Burgos
Caja Canarias
Banco de Valencia Banco de Valencia Banco de Valencia Banco de Valencia
BBVA BBVA BBVA
BBVA BBVA
     
Caixa Sabadell
Unnim UnnimCaixa Terrasa
Caixa de Manlleu
Banco Santander Banco Santander Banco Santander Banco Santander Banco Santander
Caja Madrid
BFA-Bankia BFA-Bankia BFA-Bankia BFA-Bankia
Bancaja
Insular de Canarias
Caixa Laietana
Caja de Avila
Caja Segovia
Caja Rioja
Banco Sabadell
BancoSabadell
Banco Sabadell Banco Sabadell Banco Sabadell
Banco Guipuzcoano
CAM CAM
Banco Popular Banco Popular BancoPopular
Banco Popular Banco Popular
Banco Pastor Banco Pastor BancoPastor
Unicaja
Unicaja Unicaja
Unicaja Banco Unicaja Banco
Caja Jaen
     
Caja Duero
Ceiss Ceiss
Caja España
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2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Caixa Catalunya
Calaunya Caixa Catalunya Caixa Catalunya Caixa Catalunya CaixaCaixa Tarragona
CaixaManresa
Caja Galicia
NovaGalicia Banco NovaGalicia Banco NovaGalicia Banco NovaGalicia Banco
CaixaNova
BBK
BBK
Kutxa Bank Kutxa Bank Kutxa Bank
Caja Sur
   
CajaVital CajaVital
Kutxa Kutxa
CajaMurcia
BancoMareNostrum BancoMareNostrum BancoMareNostrum BancoMareNostrum
CaixaPenedes
Caja Granada
Sa Nostra
IberCaja IberCaja IberCaja
IberCaja IberCaja
     
CAI CAI
Caja3Caja Círculo Burgos Caja Círculo Burgos
Caja Badajoz Caja Badajoz
CajAstur + CCM CajAstur
Liberbank Liberbank LiberbankCaja Extremadura Caja Extremadura
Caja Cantabria Caja Cantabria
Bankinter Bankinter Bankinter Bankinter Bankinter
Source: own elaboration.
Table 2 (continuation)
Restructuring processof the spanish financial system.
In Europe, the European Banking Authority (EBA) published the stress tests of the 
European Union for the years 2010 and 2011 and announced that it would not conduct 
new stress tests for 2012, with the next stress test for European banks to be in 2014. Nev-
ertheless in Spain, in a clear attempt to be transparent, a series of additional stress test, in 
addition to the European ones, were made in 2012.
A summary of the stress tests carried out by the Spanish banking sector is presented 
in Table 3. We show the estimated capital needs for the Spanish banking sector under an 
adverse scenario.
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It is important to note that changes in the methodology, along with others in how results 
are presented, makes it difficult to compare results.
Sample, variables and method
Sample
Our study population comprises the Spanish credit institutions and, within them, 
the two main types of entities: banks and confederated saving banks. To accurately 
determine our initial sample (12/31/2008) we use, first, the information provided by 
the Spanish Banking Association (AEB), from which we selected the top 6 Spanish 
banks by asset volume. We also took information from the Spanish Confederation of 
Savings Banks (CECA), which records the existence of 45 savings banks. Therefore, 
the target population to analyze is set initially at 51 institutions (6 banks and 45 sav-
ings banks).
The economic and financial information of the entities that was used to develop the 
empirical study was taken from the AEB and CECA websites and that concerning the 
stress test from the website of the Bank of Spain.
Table 4 shows in detail the evolution of the sample by years. We observed how from 
a total of 51 institutions in 2008 there are just 15 in 2012, because of the restructuring 
processes, which implied mergers, acquisitions and SIP.
Table 3
Stress test on the spanish banking sector.
Date Additional Capital in euros
July 2010 2,042 million (4 savings banks) EBA
July 2011 1,247 million (4 savings banks) EBA
317 million (1 bank)
June 2012 40.000 million FMI
June 2012 51,800 million Roland Berger
June 2012 51,000-62,000 million Oliver Wyman
Sept. 2012 53,755 million Oliver Wyman
Source: own elaboration. Data taken from Bank of Spain website.
Table 4
Characteristics of the simple.
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Financial Institutions 51 51 37 19 15
Source: own elaboration. Data taken from Bank of Spain website.
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Variables
a. Dependent variable
Taking into account that the main objective of our study is to determine, before and af-
ter the restructuring of the Spanish credit institutions, the degree and distinction between 
efficiency and solvency, our dependent variables are:
r Efficiency Ratio (EFIC): this indicator measures which processing costs (salaries, 
technology, rent, supplies, administrative expenses, etc.) an entity must bear to get a 
regular unit margin (net financial interests plus mediation commissions). Therefore, 
an entity will be more efficient if it applies lower processing costs for each unit of 
gross income generated. The variable is calculated for each entity as Operating 
Expenses/Gross income. This indicates that the smaller the ratio, the greater the 
efficiency.
r Solvency ratio (SOLV): this shows the ability of the entity to pay debts with its own 
resources. The variable is calculated for each entity as Equity/Current Liabilities. 
The higher this ratio, the higher the solvency.
b. Independent variable
To address the objective, we sought to combine simplicity (given the public financial 
data available) and clarity with proper intellectual rigor, so we have relied on an explana-
tory variable and four more control variables:
1. Before/After restructuring (RESTR): we created a variable that classifies the sample 
before and after the restructuring. Given that these restructuring processes began in 
2011 (annual accounts filed in 2012), we consider as before the years 2008-2010 and 
the subsequent ones as after the process.
Thus we have a dichotomous variable (RESTR) which takes the value 0 for the in-
formation referred to 2008-2010 (“before restructuring”) and value 1 for the 2011-2012 
information (“after restructuring”).
As for the control variables, first we added two variables that must be associated with 
levels of efficiency and solvency:
1. Stress Test (TEST). According to these tests, the need for additional capital of some 
entities could be related to our dependent variables, explaining that in more efficient 
and / or solvent institutions the need for capital requirements will be lower. This 
feature is shown with a numeric variable. As discussed above, the test included both 
a reference scenario and an adverse scenario. In order to calculate the Stress Test 
variable, we considered the adverse scenario for the whole bank (we analyzed banks 
on a whole. No branches).
2. Tier1 (TIER), will also be analyzed, given that entities with a higher level of own 
funds must reflect better efficiency and/or solvency ratios. The measure of this char-
acteristic is the percentage of Tier 1.
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Finally, we also included as control variables the size of the institutions and whether 
they are savings banks or banks in order to see if there is a differentiation between the 
two:
1. Banks or Savings Banks (B_S): Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if it is a Bank 
and 0 if it is a Savings Bank.
2. Size (SIZE) is measured by the logarithm of the value of assets in millions of euros.
Method
The analysis seeks to answer the question of whether the restructuring process of the 
banking sector followed the guidelines of efficiency and solvency of the sector. We use 
a multivariate model that allows us to verify the predictive capability of our previously 
defined explanatory variable, RESTRit, where each entity is i and year is t:
X
it
=ȕ
0
+ȕ
1
*RESTR
it
+ȕ
2
*B_S
it
+ȕ
3
*TEST
it
+ȕ
4
*TIER1
it
+ȕ
5
*SIZE
it
+İ
RESTR: Before or after the restructuring
B_S: Bank or Savings Bank
TEST: Additional capital requirement under the stress test
TIER1: Percentage of Tier1
SIZE: Logarithm of total assets
With this model we analyze the capacity of the explanatory variable to predict two ver-
sions of the dependent variable, Xit, the efficiency (EFFICit), defined as the ratio between 
operating expenses and gross income, and solvency (SOLV
it
), defined as the ratio between 
equity and liabilities.
With the above model, we analyze the regression of two versions, depending on wheth-
er the dependent variable is efficiency or solvency.
Results
Table 5 shows the mean, standard deviation and percentiles 25.50 (median) and 75 of 
the analysed variables. In order to go deeper into the relationship between the variables, 
we show in Table 6 their correlation coefficients. It is observed how these coefficients 
could be described as fair values and, therefore, we can state that multicollinearity is not 
a problem in our models, since the variance inflation factor (VIF) used to ensure that our 
results are not biased by the correlation between the explanatory variables (Marquardt, 
1970) is, in all cases, within acceptable limits (Guajarati, 1997).
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In order to clarify the explanatory model, we show the Granger causality test.
Efficiency:
Variable definition:
r:=EFFIC
r9
1
=RESTR
Table 6
Correlation matrix.
Efficiency Solvency RESTR B_S TEST TIER
Solvency –0.300**
RESTR 0.405** 0.037
B_S –0.197* 0.337** 0.234**
TEST 0.194* –0.127 0.293** –0.032
TIER –0.446** 0.613** –0.345** –0.014 –0.347**
SIZE –0.131 0.091 0.475** 0.507** 0.178* –0.168
Source: own elaboration.
* p<.05; ** p<.01.
Table 5
Descriptive statistic of the sample divided in: before/after the restructuring.
B/A reestructur Variables N. Obs. Mean Standard Dev. 25th Perctl. Median 75th Perctl.
Total EFFIC 136 53.94 13.72 43.48 51.32 60.40
SOLV 136 7.29 2.57 5.78 7.10 8.86
TEST 136 414.78 2438.49 0.00 0.00 0.00
TIER 136 8.72 2.07 7.42 9.00 9.60
B_S 136 0.19 0.394 0.00 0.00 0.00
SIZE 136 7.47 0.62 7.05 7.42 7.84
Before EFFIC 102 50.02 11.31 41.03 49.42 55.83
SOLV 102 7.39 2.64 5.93 7.02 9.11
TEST 102 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
TIER 102 9.16 1.84 8.70 9.00 9.95
B_S 102 0.14 0.35 0.00 0.00 0.00
SIZE 102 7.31 0.58 6.96 7.23 7.56
After EFFIC 34 64.28 14.41 51.32 61.27 74.86
SOLV 34 7.05 2.43 5.13 7.59 8.25
TEST 34 1634,71 4680.86 0.00 0.00 562.5
TIER 34 7.58 2.23 6.4 7.4 9.1
B_S 34 0.32 0.48 0.00 0.00 0.00
SIZE 34 7.90 0.49 7.58 7.82 8.11
Source: own elaboration.
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r9
2
=B_S
r9
3
=TEST
r9
4
=TIER
r9
5
=SIZE
Unrestricted model (U):
 :mȕ
0
 + ȕ
1
9
1
 + ȕ
2
9
2
 + ȕ
3
9
3
 + ȕ
4
9
4
 + ȕ
5
9
5
 + İ (1)
Restricted model (R):
 :mȕ
0
 + ȕ
2
9
2
 + ȕ
3
9
3
 + ȕ
4
9
4
 + ȕ
5,
9
5
 + İ (2)
Hypothesis H
0
: ȕ
1
=0
The test is performed by comparing the F statistic, given by:
  
(3)
Fort the analyzed case, we have:
m=1
n=134
k=6
On the other hand, the SSR are shown in the following tables,
Unrestricted model (U):
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE
Degrees of freedom Sum of squared 
resid 
Mean of squares F Critical value of F
Regression  5 0.89315614 0.17863123 14.7771534 1.9739E-11
Residue 12 1.54730729 0.01208834
Total 13 2.44046343
Restricted model (R):
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE
Degrees of freedom Sum of squared 
resid 
Mean of squares F Critical value of F
Regression  4 0.45432483 0.11358121 7.37711649 2.2072E-05
Residue 12 1.9861386 0.01539642
Total 13 2.44046343
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Then, by replacing the respective values in equation (3) we obtain:
F=36.30204>F
critical
=3.91514 (0.95 confidence level)
Therefore, we conclude that restructuring has an statistically significant effect on efficien-
cy according to Granger. 
Solvency:
Variable definition:
r:=SOLV
r9
1
=RESTR
r9
2
=B_S
r9
3
=TEST
r9
4
=TIER
r9
5
=SIZE
And about SSR:
Unrestricted model (U):
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE
Degrees of freedom Sum of squared 
resid 
Mean of squares F Critical value of 
F
Regression  5 0.01547688 0.00309538 4.41898521 0.00095671
Residue 12 0.08966043 0.00070047
Total 13 0.10513731
Restricted model (R):
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE
Degrees of freedom Sum of squared 
resid 
Mean of squares F Critical value of F
Regression  4 0.01540783 0.00385196 5.53778365 0.00038038
Residue 12 0.08972948 0.00069558
Total 13 0.10513731
Then, by replacing the respective values in equation (3) we obtain:
F=0.09858<F
critical
=3.91514 (0.95 confidence level)
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Therefore, we conclude that restructuring has no effect on solvency according to 
Granger.
Table 7 provides the mean value of the main variables analyzed. It is calculated ac-
cording to the RESTR variable. The value of the Mann Whitney and the associated sig-
nificance level are also given.
The results show how the two variables present better values on simple average before 
the restructuring process than later, which is logical at this first stage. These differences 
are statistically significant for the EFFIC variable.
Table 8 shows the evolution of the two variables for the Spanish banking sector during 
the period 2008-2012. We note that until 2011, the two variables get worse, with efficiency 
being hit harder, rising from 50.01 in 2009 to 64.28 in 2011. However in 2012 there is a 
change of trend and both variables begin to improve. In both cases the financial decisions 
of integration taken could be the explanation.
Tables 9 and 10 show the comparison, for each year, of efficiency and solvency for 
both Banks and Saving Banks. We must take into account that the restructuring process 
of the banking sector led to the grouping of savings banks in SIP that finally ended in the 
creation of banks. We must point out that those banks created through SIP among saving 
banks, were still included in the group of savings banks when presenting the data. This is 
because they originally came from savings banks and in the analysis period they are still 
in an initial process of restructuring.
Table 7
Comparison of means.
Variable Before (n=102) Median;IQR After (n=34) Median;IQR p
Efficiencya 50.4 ; 41.8-56.3 58.8 ; 51.3-73.7 <0.001***
Solvencya 6.9 ; 5.8-8.3 7.7 ; 5.1-9.4 0.627
TESTa 0 ; 0-0 0 ; 0-406 <0.001***
TIERa 9 ; 8.8-9.6 7.4 ; 6.4-9.1 0.005**
SIZEa 16.6 ; 16.0-17.3 18.0 ; 17.6-18.9 <0.001***
Banks (%)b 14.0 35.3 0.007**
Saving Banks (%)b 86.0 64.7 0.012*
a Mann-Whitney U-test; b Chi Cuadrado test.
* p<.05; ** p<.01;*** p<.001.
Table 8
Efficiency and solvency in the banking sector.
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Efficiency 50.53 50.01 56.45 64.28 59.44
Solvency 7.04 7.38 6.46 7.05 7.93
Source: own elaboration.
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First, we note that the efficiency of banks is better than the savings banks. These dif-
ferences are statistically significant for the years 2008, 2009 and 2011. Thus, our first 
research question, about efficiency, confirms as valid those financial policy decisions pro-
posed as more efficient from the economic and financial point of view. That is, the legal 
transformation of the savings banks, their absorption by the banks and/or their integration 
to become banks. 
Similarly, for solvency, it is observed how the solvency of banks is better than savings 
banks. These differences are statistically significant for the years 2009, 2011 y 2012. 
Therefore, the above comments for efficiency would be the same for solvency.
Analysis
Table 11 shows the results of regression models 1 and 2. The results obtained are en-
tirely consistent with what was indicated in the descriptive analysis. For Model 1, where 
the dependent variable is efficiency, RESTR variable reflects a positive relationship in the 
Table 9
Efficiency. Banks-saving banks (Mann-Whitney U-test).
Year Type Median IQR p
2008 Banks (n=7) 44.6 40.8-50.5
.043*
Saving Banks (n=43) 52.1 45.3-57.4
2009 Banks (n=7) 40.8 34.6-50.8
.034*
Saving Banks (n=42) 50.3 41.7-57.0
2011 Banks (n=6) 49.6 45.7-58.4
.001**
Saving Banks (n=13) 66.4 61.3-76.3
2012 Banks (n=6) 50.5 46.6-56.4
.289
Saving Banks (n=9) 56.3 54.6-64.5
*p<.05; **p<.01.
Table 10
Solvency. Banks-saving banks (Mann-Whitney U-test).
Year Type Median IQR p
2008 Banks (n=7) 7.6 6.9-8.2
.150
  Saving Banks (n=43) 6.6 5.5-7.8
2009 Banks (n=7) 8.4 6.8-9.4
.037*
  Saving Banks (n=42) 7.0 5.8-7.9
2011 Banks (n=6) 9.2 8.1-10.4
.004**
  Saving Banks (n=13) 5.5 5.1-7.7
2012 Banks (n=6) 10.4 8.7-11.5
.012*
  Saving Banks (n=9) 4.8 2.6-7.5
*p<.05; **p<.01.
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Table 11
Multiple linear regression models.
Model 1: EFFIC=ȕ
0
+ȕ
1
*RESTR+ȕ
2
*B_S+ȕ
2
*TEST+ȕ
2
*TIER1+ȕ
2
*SIZE+İ
Model 2: SOLV=ȕ
0
+ȕ
1
*RESTR+ȕ
2
*B_S+ȕ
2
*TEST+ȕ
2
*TIER1+ȕ
2
*SIZE+İ
Predictors Efficiency Model (n=136) Solvency Model (n=136)
Beta (SE) P Beta (SE) p
RESTR 0.170 (0.031) <0.001*** 0.003 (0.035) 0.638
B_S –0.057(0.035) 0.107 0.016 (0.006) 0.017*
TEST 0.001(0.001) 0.314 0.001(0.001) 0.972
TIER –0.018 (0.006) 0.006** 0.007(0.001) <0.001***
SIZE –0.033(0.011) 0.003** 0.001(0.002) 0.692
R2 (%) 53.2 47.3
Model F(5;130)=13.89*** F(5;130)=11.13***
Assumptions
Normalitya p=0.185 p=0.200
Independenceb 1.872 1.977
Homoscedasticityc p=0.923 p=0.589
a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for residuals values; b Durbin-Watson; c Levene test between residuals and 
predicted values.
* p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001.
coefficient and a statistically significant value. This positive relationship in the coefficients 
is just confirming that efficiency in the banking sector was, on average, better before the 
restructuring than later. This would be explained by the fact that the restructuring process 
which would bear fruit in subsequent years began in 2011. This shows that those with better 
efficiency and solvency are the ones which must offset the lower values of the rest, which 
explains the drop in average after the initial restructuring.
Meanwhile, variables SIZE and TIER reflect a negative relationship in the ratio and 
return statistically significant values. This negative relationship indicates that larger insti-
tutions are more efficient than smaller ones. Also, entities with the highest percentage of 
Tier1 ratio have higher efficiency than those with the lowest percentage of Tier1. 
As for model 2, where the dependent variable is solvency, results show that B_S and 
TIER variables reflect a positive relationship in the ratio and have statistically significant 
values. These positive relationships indicate that banks have better solvency ratio than 
savings banks and that those which show the highest percentage of Tier1 have higher 
solvency ratios.
Conclusions
As a result of the general economic situation, the Spanish financial system was forced 
to undertake a restructuring process, which finally began in late 2011 – annual accounts 
presented in June / July 2012 – and during the years 2012-2013. The existence and dis-
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posal of the annual accounts after the application of 2011 and 2012 provides consistency 
to our study.
This paper, in its main research question and from the public financial data available, 
confirms that:
r Any transformation of savings banks into banks follows a logical criterion of financial 
policy. Solvency and efficiency values of the Banks are better than those of the savings 
banks. These differences increase over the period 2008-2012.
r These results confirm related previous studies such as Fernández de Guevara (2007); 
Carbó and Maudos (2010) and Climent (2013).
We confirm that these processes have not been yet fruitful in terms of the values ob-
tained by the Spanish financial institutions in their ratios of efficiency and solvency but 
no doubt they will in the future, especially considering the legislative decisions taken in 
late 2011 and throughout 2012, and financial information containing the first financial 
statements published after restructuring.
Indeed, from the second analysis made, which is justified because of the data-set that 
it provides, which means we can carry through this investigation in the following years 
(2013-2016), we can conclude that:
r Opposite to the main question, the second one indicates that the efficiency and solven-
cy of banks and savings banks was higher, in global, before the restructuring. This is 
explained by the short management time to enable improvements in efficiency and sol-
vency. Also, the best entities absorb or integrate those which showed the worst indexes. 
According to previous studies cited, the improvements in efficiency in the restructuring 
processes require a clear legal framework; macroeconomic conditions and proper time 
to manage the new entities. This was started in late 2011 and continued decisively 
throughout 2012, so this variable will begin to improve results from 2013 and 2014, as 
was confirmed in previous studies of different countries and financial systems analyzed 
in this work.
r Nevertheless, in one of the new groups an improvement in solvency was observed. This 
is justified by the strengthening of own resources obtained via Government aid. Thus, 
it appears that this measure advocated by, among others things, the stress test, is very 
successful, either through diminished sale of risk, state capitalization or the market. 
In this regard, further evidence was obtained that the institutions with the highest 
efficiency are those that do not need additional capital according to the results of the 
stress test performed.
In short, we can say that these results justify the need for further steady implementa-
tion and control of the reform processes in the Spanish banking sector. The experience of 
previous restructuring processes shows that, although they certainly do require time, it is 
probably harmful to extend them too much, as this involves uncertainty in the market and 
the main agents related to these institutions. Therefore, the decisions taken on economic 
and financial policy which establish deadlines and coercive criteria seem to be correct, 
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because previous literature confirms that restructuring should be done in a decisive and 
quick way, with regulatory intervention and keeping investors and several other agents in 
the process informed.
Regarding the future research lines, we understand the need to supervise the future 
development of both main variables analyzed (profitability and solvency). We would also 
like to check if, as we understand that it will happen, the evolution of both variables will 
still be positive and will increase when the restructuring processes come to an end.
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